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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44664
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-8877
v. )
)
MAURICIO LARA-MEDINA, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF





STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Victor Uriarte-Gonzalez1 contends the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed and executed his sentences in this case.  He contends a sufficient
consideration of the facts of this case reveals that suspended sentences would better
1 As pointed out in the district court, “Victor Uriarte-Gonzalez” is the appellant’s given
name, and “Mauricio Lara-Medina” is an alias.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.16, Ls.1-10; R., p.46;
see also Tr., p.39, L.14 - p. 40, L.16 (defense counsel discussing why the appellant had
been using the name “Lara-Medina”).)  The district court interlineated the original
Information filed in this case to reflect that fact.  (R., p.38; see also R., p.76 (the
judgment of conviction listing both names).)  As the appellant would prefer to be
referred to by his given name, he will be referred to as “Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez,” in this
brief.
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serve the goals of sentencing.  As such, this Court should vacate the order executing
his sentences and remand this case for an order suspending Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez’s
sentences.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez pled guilty to possession of
cocaine, felony driving under the influence, and misdemeanor injury to a child.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.4-8.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss other charges, to not file a
habitual offender enhancement, and to limit its sentencing recommendation to an
aggregate term of ten years, with three years fixed.    (See R., pp.70-71.)  Mr. Uriarte-
Gonzalez expressed remorse for his actions and accepted responsibility for the
consequences thereof.  (Tr., p.43, Ls.15-23.)
The presentence report (hereinafter, PSI) concluded Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez
presented only a moderate risk to reoffend.  (PSI, p.17.)  He presented no mental health
issues, and the GAIN-I evaluator recommended out-patient treatment to address his
substance abuse issues.  (PSI, pp.29, 32.)  At the sentencing hearing, several family
members came to support Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez.  (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-5.)
However, as defense counsel explained, the sentencing determination in this
case would have to take into account the fact that Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez would be facing
deportation proceedings once he was released from custody in Idaho.  (Tr., p.37,
Ls.1-2.)  Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez accepted the fact that he will likely be deported, and so,
was making plans to earn a living in Mexico rather than try to return to the United States
again.  (See Tr., p.41, Ls.9-12; PSI, p.11.)  Nevertheless, federal prosecutors had also
indicated a desire to prosecute Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez for his illegal reentry to the United
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States, which would likely result in a period of federal incarceration prior to his ultimate
deportation.  (Tr., p.37, Ls.2-7, p.39, Ls.1-6; PSI, p.10.)  As a result of the federal
detainer, defense counsel acknowledged the district court’s ability to fashion a sentence
which would effectively serve the goals of sentencing, particularly rehabilitation, was
somewhat reduced, and thus, a sentence ordered to be served immediately would do
little more than extend the length of time Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez is incarcerated for,
essentially, only punitive purposes.  (Tr., p.36, Ls.22-24, p.38, Ls.17-22.)  In order to
address that additional issue, defense counsel recommended the district court impose
sentences for the maximum term allowed by statute, but suspend those sentences and
allow the federal prosecution and deportation proceedings to begin without further
delay.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-6.)  In doing that, defense counsel noted, the district court could
make “not reentering the United States” a condition of probation, and so, bring the term
of incarceration back into play if Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez did return to the United States
again.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.6-16.)
The judge rejected that recommendation, taking what it called a “broader view” of
its ability to address the other goals of sentencing besides punishment.  (Tr., p.44,
Ls.22-25.)  It concluded that a suspended sentence in this case would depreciate the
seriousness of the offenses to which Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez had pled.  (Tr., p.45,
Ls.15-19.)  As a result, on the two felony charges, it imposed and executed identical,
concurrent sentences of seven years, with three years fixed, and it imposed a
concurrent term of 180 days on the misdemeanor charge.  (Tr., p.45, L.20 - p.46, L.3.)




Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed
Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez’s sentences in this case.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Uriarte-
Gonzalez’s Sentences In This Case
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App.
1982).  The appellate courts review such discretionary decisions to determine if the
lower court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries
of that discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion in the
district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria,
the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho 293, 294 (1997).
In this case, the district court’s decision to execute Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez’s
sentence was not reached by an exercise of reason.  As defense counsel pointed out at
the sentencing hearing, the goals of sentencing would be more effectively addressed in
this case by a sentence which would:  (a) allow the federal government to timely move
forward with illegal reentry charges and deportation proceedings; and (b) allow for the
incarceration to be put into effect should Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez return to the United
States.  (See Tr., p.38, Ls.1-6.)  As defense counsel explained, some of the district
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court’s ability to address the normal considerations in sentencing was restricted by the
fact that the federal government had placed a detainer warrant on Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.1-7.)  For example, the State would not have the opportunity to employ
out-patient rehabilitative programs for Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez despite the fact that the
GAIN-I was recommending he participate in such a program.  (See Tr., p.36, Ls.22-24;
PSI, p.29.)  Therefore, despite the district court’s assertion that it was taking “a broader
view” of its sentencing options (Tr., p.44, Ls.24-25), in the immediate term, incarceration
in Idaho would do little but serve to increase the time Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez, a father of
three, is sitting in prison.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.17-22; PSI, p.13.)
On the other hand, the sentencing alternative defense counsel recommended
accounts for that concern.  It would allow the federal government to begin its
prosecution now, as opposed to three years from now.  As a result, it would allow the
deportation proceedings to begin timely (after the probable period of federal
incarceration), in which case, Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez would be able to return to Mexico,
get a job, resume supporting his family, and meet his other financial obligations sooner.
(See PSI, p.11 (Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez discussing his prospects for employment in
Mexico).)  It would also allow the district court to hold the term of incarceration over
Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez, and, should he try to return to this country, deploy the punishment
at that time, when it would actually serve as a more-effective deterrent (particularly in
terms of specific deterrence) as opposed to simply incarcerating him in the immediate
term.
Basically, the district court, in its “broader view,” failed to take into account the
impact of the cumulative sentencing that is likely to occur upon Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez’s
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ultimate release from the Idaho Department of Correction.  That is problematic since
that factor significantly impacts how Idaho’s sentences will address the goals of
sentencing, particularly in regard to any impact those sentences might have on the goal
of rehabilitation. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008)
(reaffirming the principle that prison sentences should be crafted so that they do not
incarcerate a defendant longer than is necessary, particularly when age or rehabilitation
decreases the risk of recidivism); see also State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971)
(rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal
sanction”), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103
(2015).  As such, the sentencing alternative which better serves all the goals of
sentencing upon consideration of all the relevant facts is the alternative recommended
by defense counsel.  Thus, the district court’s decision to the contrary – to execute,
rather than suspend, Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez’s sentences – constitutes an abuse of its
discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Uriarte-Gonzalez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
executing his sentences and remand this case for an order placing him on probation.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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